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Abstract
This paper investigates whether the choice of the net versus gross measure of monetary
transfers from adult children to their elderly parents can explain the differences in the estimates
of the wage effect on money transfers found in earlier studies. It carefully documents the
transfer pattern and points to the limitations of the OLS specification in the analysis of either
gross out-transfers from adult children to elderly parents or net transfers. A four-part model
is offered as a better alternative for the analysis of intergenerational monetary exchange. This
model consists of two Cragg’s double hurdle models for out-transfers and in-transfers. The
results from estimating this model uncover the following empirical regularities. First, wages
of adult children play an important role in the determination of the transfers at the extensive
margin: adult children with higher wages are more likely to give to their elderly parents and
less likely to receive. Second, among those who participate in the exchange process wages
have no effect on the amount of transfer given to parents, while having a positive effect on the
amount of transfer received from parents. Finally, it has been found that certain characteristics
have similar effect on both probability of being a a giver and a recipient. These features provide
a useful guideline for future theoretical research. One of the possible theoretical models that
possesses such features is outlined in this paper.
Introduction
Decreased provision of informal care to elderly parents in response to increasing wages of adult
children may translate into a significant cost to the society unless compensated in some way
within the families. According to Nizalova’s (2012) findings, a 10% increase in wages leads to
an 18% decrease in average informal care provided by males and a 36% decrease in average
informal care provided by females. One of the potential counter effects of increased wages is
increased financial assistance provided to elderly parents. However, evidence on these effects
is mixed and scarce. Nizalova (2012) finds close to zero effect of wages on monetary transfers
while earlier literature documented a negligible wage elasticity of informal care supply and a
considerable wage effect on monetary transfers. The difference in findings could be explained
by the wage endogeneity addressed in Nizalova (2012). However, it turns out that this is not
the only methodological difference among the earlier studies.
In addition to employing an instrumental variable approach to deal with wage endogeneity,
Nizalova (2012) uses the net measure of monetary transfers and estimates average effects in
the population by OLS. Earlier studies use gross transfers to elderly parents and adopt Tobit
specifications. Thus, it is not clear what is responsible for the observed differences in the
estimated effects.
The current paper represents a first attempt at systematic analysis of the choice of the
transfer measure, focusing on the literature that studies the effect of wages on monetary
transfers to elderly parents. The paper does not aim to establish the superiority of one
measure over the other. Rather the goal is to show the importance of this choice and the
circumstances when one would be more appropriate than the other, and to emphasize the
consequences that the choice may have for the conclusions. In addition, the paper addresses
the difficulty related to the empirical analysis of net monetary transfers and, by means of a
four-part empirical model, uncovers important features of the reality. The overall effect of
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higher wages on net transfers, defined as tranfers given by adult children to elderly parents
minus transfers received from parents, is positive. So, children do compensate parents with
higher monetary transfers as their wages increase. However, most of the effect is coming
from the extensive margin, with females having twice larger impact on the probability of
being a giver in response to the same increase in wages compared to males (0.25 vs. 0.12).
Interestingly, among both males and females the probability of receiving monetary transfers
decreases with higher wages, but among those who do receive money from their parents, higher
wages are associated with larger transfer amount, providing some support to the exchange
transfer motive.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides the background and documents
the coexistence of the different measures of transfers in the literature on intergenerational
exchange. In addition, this section provides a detailed review of results from the studies
that focus on the effect of wages on monetary transfers to elderly parents. Section 2 provides
empirical evidence that the differences in the earlier studies are attributable to the choice of the
transfer measure. Actual transfer patterns and limitations of OLS specification are discussed
in Section 3 as possible sources of the difference in the wage effects. Section 4 outlines a four-
part empirical model for the study of net monetary transfers and presents empirical results.
Finally, Section 5 discusses the existing theoretical model of intergenerational exchange and
outlines a new model that incorporates the findings from the current paper.
1 Background
This paper focuses on the effect of individuals’ wages on intergenerational monetary transfers
between them and their elderly parents. In the related literature and the broader intergener-
ational exchange literature two measures of transfers are used: gross and net. Table 1 shows
different measures of transfers used in the empirical literature where the adult child is the
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unit of analysis. Thus, gross transfers received (in-transfers or downstream transfers) are
defined as flows of money to adult children from their elderly parents. Gross transfers given
(out-transfers or upstream transfers) are flows of money to elderly parents from their adult
children. Net transfers are defined as the difference between gross out-transfers and gross
in-transfers. Therefore, net transfers can be thought of as a balance, or outcome, of the two
processes of giving and receiving in the exchange between a generation of adult children and a
generation of their elderly parents. Negative /positive net transfers refer to the flows of money
received /given by adult children over and above what they have given /received themselves.
There exist circumstances when one measure would be preferred over the other, depending
on the research and policy questions that are being analyzed. For example, if one is interested
in the effect of a tax reform on gifts and inter-vivos transfers, then the gross measure of
transfers given should be studied. Also, if the question is how an individual adjusts his/her
support to elderly parents in response to a change in the opportunity costs of time then again
the gross measure of transfers is the right measure to analyze, as the focus here is on the
process of giving itself. However, if one seeks to evaluate costs of a policy reform to the
whole society, e.g. to find out whether decreased provision of informal care is compensated
by an increase in the financial assistance received by the elderly, as in Nizalova (2012), then
the analysis of the gross flow of money from the younger generation to the older generation
is not sufficient. If the gross transfer measure is analyzed in search for such compensatory
effects, both those who do not give any money and those who receive money from their parents
are treated as non-contributors to that gross flow. This may overestimate the wage effect if
some of the parents will actually increase their transfers to adult children in response to the
increased opportunity cost of their children’s time. It is also possible that the analysis of the
gross transfer measure may provide some insight as to the net transfer measure and vice versa.
But this question has not been directly addressed in the literature.
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The literature studying the role of wages in intergenerational exchange is very scarce. Thus
it is beneficial to consult first with the more developed literature on transfer motives. Keeping
in mind that net transfers in the transfer motivation literature are net transfers received, this
literature can be classified along several dimensions: (i) the origin of the data (developed and
developing countries), (ii) the choice of the transfer measure (net transfers received, positive
net transfers received, or gross transfers received1), (iii) the use of econometric technique
(OLS, Tobit, Cragg’s (1971) two-part model).
1.1 Intergenerational Transfer Motives Literature
Net transfers tend to be used more often in the studies on developing countries - the set-
ting in which intergenerational exchange is much more prevalent (Kuhn and Stillman, 2004;
Frankenberg and Kuhn, 2004; Cox, Eser, and Jimenez, 1998; Cox, Hansen, and Jimenez,
2004; Kazianga, 2003; Cox, Jimenez, and Okrasa, 1997). These studies usually use OLS
specifications. A few studies (Cox, 1987; Cox and Rank,1992) use net transfer measure with
the US data. However, they define their measure of transfer as positive net transfer received,
thus assigning a status of non-participants to net givers. They follow Cragg’s (1971) two-part
specification consisting of one equation for the decision to transfer (either probit or logit)
and one selectivity-corrected OLS equation estimated on the sample with non-zero positive
transfers. The rest of the literature uses the gross measure of transfers in either OLS or Tobit
specifications with the data from the United States (McGarry and Schoeni, 1995; McGarry,
1999; Schoeni, 1997). Two papers by Lillard and Willis (1997) and Frankenberg, Lillard, and
Willis (2002) stand apart from this classification. They both apply two-part models to study
the gross measure of transfers given by respondents to their children and transfers received
by respondents from their children in the context of Malasiya and Indonesia.
1Positive net transfers received and gross transfers received treat net givers and givers respectively as non-
contributors to intergenerational exchange.
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Several papers have footnotes or short comments about the choice of the transfer measure.
For instance, Schoeni (1997) makes his choice based on the argument that a child (or a parent)
can only make his/her own decision and cannot force the other party to make a transfer no
matter how negative the desired amount of transfer may be. Cameron and Cobb-Clark (2002)
provide a footnote where they mention that empirical estimation using a net measure of
transfers does not give the same statistical power as estimation using a gross measure, thus
explaining their choice of the gross measure.
What adds to the confusion about the appropriateness of gross versus net measure of
transfers is the use of different measures by the same author(s). This can be illustrated by the
following example. Cox and his coauthors (Cox, 1987; Cox and Rank, 1992; Cox, Eser, and
Jimenez, 1997) mostly analyzed the positive net monetary transfer measure from parents to
their adult children in a two-part specification.2 However, Cox, Hansen, and Jimenez (1999)
use the full net transfer measure for the analysis instead with no justification for the switch
from the positive net transfer measure. A possible explanation for this may be related to
the choice of an empirical approach. The authors estimate a regression with an endogenous
spline. This task may not be technically feasible with a two-part model.
Another possible explanation for the observed pattern of the use of different measures
of transfers and different econometric techniques may be the prevalence of participation in
intergenerational exchange. With the low prevalence of exchange, the distribution of net
monetary transfers possesses very undesirable features that create difficulties for econometric
modeling and further estimation. So, the larger is the prevalence of exchange, as for example
in developing countries,3 the more likely it is that the net transfer measure will be used in the
2The word “elderly” is omitted here because these studies include a wide range of ages on the side of givers and the
side of recipients.
3For example, 80% of Filipino households (Cox, Hansen, and Jimenez , 2004) 25-50% of Bangla and 70-79% of
Indonesiona households (Frankenberg and Kuhn, 2004) are involved in intergenerational exchange, while this number
varies from 15 to 25 % in the United States.
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analysis. On the contrary, studies based on the Health and Retirement Study data (HRS),
which has lower prevalence of non-zero transfers, usually rely on the gross measure of transfers
and adopt either OLS or Tobit specifications (McGarry and Schoeni, 1995; McGarry, 1999;
Schoeni, 1997; Pezzin and Schone, 2000; McGarry, 2003).4
1.2 Literature on the Wage Effect on Intergenerational Transfers
There are only five studies of the wage effects on intergenerational transfers that the author
is familiar of (Sloan et al., 2002; Zissimopoulos, 2001; Ioannides and Kan, 1999; Sloan et al.,
1997; Couch et al., 1999; Nizalova, 2006). All of them use data from the United States, but
they differ in their choice of the transfer measure and their empirical approach. The studies
that utilize data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the National Survey
of Families and Households (NSFH) include much younger children than do those based on
the Health and Retirement Study, thus the adjective “elderly” is omitted in this discussion.
Table 2 contains a summary of these studies. It includes the estimated wage effects and the
wage elasticities of monetary transfer calculated where possible.
Couch, Daly, and Wolf (1999), using data from the 1988 wave of the PSID, estimate a
system of four Tobit equations for gross money transfer to parents, time transfer to parents,
labor market time, and housework time simultaneously. Subsamples of coupled households,
households headed by unmarried men, and households headed by unmarried women are con-
sidered separately. They find that a 1% increase in wages is associated with a 1.44% increase
in the amount of money transfered by adult married males to their elderly parents, and a
2.44% increase in the gross money transfer to elderly parents originating from single females.
The response to a 1% increase in female wages in a coupled household and in wages of single
males is found to be about 0.4%.
Similar to Couch et al. (1999), Ioannides and Kan (2000) use PSID data but study
4A small share of non-zero transfers leads to noisy estimates in the second part of the model.
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two-directional transfers using both univariate Tobit models and bivariate Probit models for
different combinations of gross transfers to and from parents. They find that higher wages
of children are associated with more money being transfered to parents and with less money
being received from parents. However, the estimated effect on transfers received is not precise.
As could be seen from Table 2 their estimates are quite modest in comparison to those from
Couch et al. (1999).
Zissimopoulos (2001) studies the existence of a substitution between time and monetary
transfers from the perspective of elderly parents. She estimates separate Tobit equations for
gross monetary transfers measured in logarithms finding a small but significant positive effect
of wages.
Sloan, Zhang, and Wang (2002) use a two-part model consisting of a logit for the
probability of giving a transfer and OLS for the logarithm of the actual amount given to
explain the decisions of adult children - HRS respondents. They find significant positive
effect of wages on gross monetary transfers to elderly parents, at both extensive and intensive
margins. The estimated elasticity at the extensive margin is quite high, making the overall
wage elasticity estimate close to 3.
Finally, Nizalova (2012) uses data from the 1998 HRS wave and estimates OLS and
a two-stage least squares model for net monetary transfers. This paper finds no evidence
of positive effect of wages on net financial flows from adult children to their elderly parents.
Moreover, the two-stage least squares estimate of the wage effect on the net monetary transfer
given by female children is negative.
To summarize, the wage elasticity of gross transfers to elderly parents is always positive
and in most cases statistically significant, but this is not found in studies that use the net
transfer measure. The hypothesis explored in this paper is that the differences in the earlier
results are mainly due to the choice of the transfer measure. Alternatively, those differences
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may be explained by the data used or the choice of the empirical methods. Therefore, this
study will focus on a single data set offering a new empirical approach which has a potential
of reconciling theoretical arguments with the estimates from empirical literature.
2 Empirical Test
2.1 Data
The analysis in this paper relies on the data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). The
Health and Retirement Study is a national longitudinal survey representing a rich source of
information on the lives of older Americans, their health and economic status. It also includes
extensive data on intergenerational transfers and characteristics of parents and children. The
Study consists of people born in 1947 and earlier, totaling to more than 21000 respondents.5
The analysis covers the period 1992-2008 and focuses on HRS respondents with at least
one living parent linked to the information on all living parents as a group. Information on
transfers is taken from the next wave survey. Since transfer variables are based on a two-
year recall period, this information is linked to the information on respondents and parents
available at the previous wave. Thus it is assumed that individuals made transfer decisions
during the wave i to (i+1) based on the information available at wave i (Sloan, Zhang, and
Wang 2002). The analysis is implemented separately for men and for women. The samples
contain 4041 males and 4462 females with 11,387 and 13,275 observations respectively. Table
3 presents summary statistics for the two samples. For details on sample restrictions see
Nizalova (2012).
5HRS started in 1992 with the cohort of individuals born in 1931-1941, and AHEAD started in 1993 with the cohort
of individuals born in 1923 and earlier. The survey of those cohorts continued every two years till 1998 when both
surveys were combined into one and two other cohorts, Children of Depression Age (CODA) cohort born in 1924-1930
and War Babies (WB) cohort born in 1942-1947, were added.
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2.2 Nonparametric Evidence
Figure 1 depicts the non-parametric estimation6 of the wage effect on monetary transfers
using different measures separately for men and women. The first and the second columns of
the graph show that the association between the wage and the transfers differs depending on
which measure of transfers is used. While the effect of wages on gross out-transfers is clearly
positive for most of the wage range, it slopes negatively for the net out-transfer measure for
a certain range of wages. Although the non-parametric analysis does not take into account
many other factors it indicates the importance of being careful with the choice of the measure,
as this choice may have important effects on the conclusions.
2.3 OLS Estimation Results
To supplement the non-parametric evidence, Table 4 presents the results from the multivariate
OLS regressions.7 As could be seen from columns (1)-(2) and (4)-(5), the estimates of the
coefficients on wages differ depending on the measure of transfers used. This exercise suggests
that the use of different transfer measures and not the use of different data sets (and/or
different econometric techniques) is responsible for the differences found in the estimates of
the wage effects. Up to this point, the objective has been to document the existence of the
difference between the wage effects on net versus gross transfers, controlling for other possible
contributors to the difference, such as the data set and the empirical specification. The next
section is devoted to the discussion of possible sources of the difference in the estimates.
6Locally weighted smoothing (lowess) kernel estimator using the ksm routine in STATA with a bandwidth setting
of 0.4.
7Justification for this specification including discussion of the control variables can be found in Nizalova (2012).
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3 Possible Explanations for the Difference in the Wage Effects
As the previous section has shown, the difference in the estimated wage effects does seem to
stem from the choice of the transfer measure. In this case two issues deserve investigation.
On the one hand, net transfers and gross transfers may be totally different variables for each
particular observation and this may be the primary reason for the differences in the results.
On the other hand, the degree of possible inconsistency in two measures maybe different. As
Wooldridge (2002, p.524) shows, the OLS estimates for censored outcome are inconsistent
since the relationship between dependent and independent variables is non-linear.8 Nothing
is known about the possibility of inconsistency for the dependent variables similar to the net
transfer measure, but by analogy one may suspect presence of inconsistency in these estimates
as well. This section will consider these two issues in turn.
3.1 Transfer Pattern
The upper part of 3 describes the pattern of intergenerational transfers as observed in the
HRS data. As can be seen, the transfer incidence is quite low - slightly more than 20% of
individuals engage in intergenerational exchange of money with their parents.9 Although the
percentage of givers is higher than the percentage of recipients in the generation of adult
children (13% versus 5%), conditional on the transfer status, the amount of money given is
considerably smaller than the amount of money received (about $1500 versus $4700).
Another interesting observation in the transfer pattern is that less than 1% of individuals
engage in both giving and receiving at the same time.10 So for the majority of the participants
8Wooldridge also shows that the estimates are inconsistent by the same multiplicative factor, so that the relative
effects can effectively be recovered from the regression.
9Prevalence of monetary transfers between younger children and their parents is somewhat higher and their pattern
is different in HRS. For example, Ioannides and Kan (2000) numbers from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics are
the following: 4.1% of children’s households give monetary transfers and 22% receive them. However, the average age
of children in the PSID is 36, while in the HRS it is about 55 years old. So, this age difference may explain the reverse
pattern of transfers in the HRS compared to the PSID.
10This number would have been even smaller if the data were organized at the level of child-parent dyads as in some
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in intergenerational exchange the actual magnitude of transfers is the same whether one
considers the gross or the net measure. Then the only difference between the gross and
the net measure of transfers is the way in which the net recipients are treated. When the
gross measure is considered individuals who are receiving transfers from their parents are
treated as non-participants in the process, while the net measure differentiates them from
non-participants.
Assuming no overlap between gross givers and gross recipients (which is close to the ob-
served pattern), it is possible to derive an algebraic relationship for the estimates of marginal
effects and elasticities for the two transfer measures. Appendix A presents the calculations
documenting this relationship. Intuitively, the relationship between the estimates of the wage
effect on gross versus net transfers depends on the relationship between wages and transfers
among the recipients. By replacing negative transfers with zeros the distribution of the de-
pendent variable is suppressed. So, if higher wages are associated with less transfers being
received by the recipients then the estimated coefficient on net transfers is larger in magni-
tude than the estimated coefficient on gross transfers, and then the latter represents the lower
bound of the effect on net transfers. If, on the contrary, higher wages lead to higher transfers
from parents, as in the case of the exchange motive, then the wage effect on gross transfers
is smaller than that on net transfers. Finally, if there is no relationship between wages and
transfers for recipients, then the estimated coefficients should be the same:
βNet = βGross + βNegP (y < 0)
V ar(x|y < 0)
V ar(x)
(1)
Also, as is obvious from the formula, the difference between the estimates depends on the
relative variation in wages among the recipients and in the population as a whole: a larger
of the early studies on the topic. As the data in the current study links the information on an individual to the data on
all related parents (including in-laws) as a group, this explains the existence of the small group of simultaneous givers
and recipients.
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spread of wages among the recipients increases the gap between the effects estimated for net
versus gross transfers.
As the results in Table 4 confirm, the relationship between wages and transfers among
recipients is different from that among givers. However, as mentioned earlier both estimates
may have different asymptotic biases. The next subsection discusses the implications of that.
3.2 OLS Shortcomings
Although the OLS estimates approximate the effect of x on E(y|x) when x is near its popula-
tion mean (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 525) no matter what the distribution of y is, there exist two
significant shortcomings that have implications for the parameter estimation. These short-
comings become especially important in the context of the net monetary transfers.
First, the distribution of net transfers has considerable concentration of mass on zero.
The majority of the population chooses not to participate in intergenerational exchange of
money and the OLS does not account for this fact. The other has to do with the nature
of the net transfer measure. It is an outcome of the two processes of giving and receiving,
and arguably it would be too restrictive to assume that both processes are governed by the
same mechanism. However, the OLS imposes this restriction by assuming that the effects of
explanatory variables are the same throughout the net transfer distribution.
Comparison of Columns (2) and (3) ((5) and (6) for females) in Table 4 confirms the
possibility of the existence of different effects for different parts of the net transfer distribution.
Some of the factors have the opposite effect on gross in-transfers when compared to gross
out-transfers, leading to canceling out of the effect on net transfers. Others work in the
same direction, amplifying the effect on net transfers. Focusing only on the factors that are
statistically significant in at least one of the equations reveals the following. More educated
individuals both give less and receive less. Both non-whites and hispanic give more and receive
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less. Married males are giving less with no difference from the base group in terms of receving,
while the opposite is true for women - they receive less with no effect of transfers given. Having
more older children is associated with greater amount of money received from elderly parents.
Number of siblings of the same sex reduces the transfers received from parents. The number
of parents is associated both with more money given and more money received. Moreover,
the greater is the share of mothers among living parents the greater is the amount of transfer
given with no effect on those received. Parents’ age and education increases the amount of
transfer received for both men and women, having no effect on transfer given. This may be
suggestive of the effect of certain factors on the decision to participate in exchange, not on the
amount of transfers, as the estimates shown in Table 4 combine both effects at the extensive
and at the intensive margin.
To summarize, the OLS results mask some of the features of the intergenerational exchange
that may be important for understanding the reality. Taking into account all of the mentioned
considerations, an empirical model that would overcome these difficulties should provide for
the following: (i) the existence of the differential effect of wages on net transfers depending on
whether it is a negative or a positive part of the net transfer distribution, (ii) the separation
of the effect at the extensive and intensive margins. The next section will be devoted to
an exploration of a four-part model as an alternative in estimating the wage effect on net
monetary transfers.
4 Four-part Model as a More Flexible Estimation Strategy for the
Analysis of Net Transfers
One of the possible models that possesses the features described in the previous section could
be a variation combining two Cragg’s (1971) two-part models. It consists of an equation(s)
describing the decision to participate in exchange (either give or receive transfers) and two
13
separate OLS equations for the amount of positive net transfers given conditional on giver
status and for the amount of negative net transfers conditional on recipient status.
4.1 Model Description
Assume that the transfer is determined in two stages. In the first stage an individual decides
which transfer status to assume and then in the second stage the amount of the transfer is
determined. There exist three possibilities j = 1, 2, 3 with one corresponding to a status of
the net recipient, two to a status of the non-participant, and three to a status of the net
giver. Adopting Dow and Endersby’s (2004) approach, assume that an individual i’s utility
in case he/she chooses status j is Uij . It is a function of both child’s (X
C
i ) and parent’s
(XPi ) characteristics and its parameters may differ depending on the chosen status. Also, for
simplification, this utility function can be thought of as a weighted sum of the utilities of both
the child and the parent. Thus,




i )γj + ǫij (2)
It is assumed that individuals are utility maximizers and after calculating values of the
utility function in three different cases they choose the transfer status that gives them the
highest utility. Therefore, the probability that the individual i will choose to be, for example,
a net recipient is the following:
Pi1 = P (Ui1 > Ui2, Ui1 > Ui3) (3)
So, for any m in the transfer status set:
Pm = P
[












It is assumed that the errors are distributed multivariate normal with mean zero and a
symmetric covariance matrix.
Although this model has its own important limitations, like, for example, the assumption
of a multivariate normal distribution of errors, it offers several significant advantages for the
study of net monetary transfers. First of all, it tackles the highly skewed distribution of
net transfers by disaggregating analysis into several pieces. This strategy has a potential
of producing more consistent results by allowing for non-linearity of the effects. Second, by
separating the intensive and extensive margins it sheds some light on where the effect of the
wage change comes from: whether more people quit taking money from their parents and start
giving back to them or whether those people who are already providing financial assistance
start to transfer larger amounts. A third advantage is that it allows for heterogeneous effects.
For example, people with certain characteristics (e.g. more or less educated, married, or those
having more parents) are simply more likely to participate in any exchange (either giving or
receiving). Finally, it does allow for differences in the parameters depending on the transfer
status. All the listed advantages bring a better understanding of how the net transfers are
determined and thus may provide further guidance for theoretical modeling.
4.2 Results
Tables 5–6 show the results from the estimation of a four-part model which is a combination
of two Gragg’s (1971) double-hurdle models for out-transfers and in-transfers.
As could be seen from the results on out-transfer status for males (see Columns (1) and (3)
in Table 5), wages have unambiguously positive effect on the probability of being a net giver
and negative effect on the probability of being a net recipient. At the same time the amount of
the transfer given is not affected by wages in a statistically significant way, while the amount
of transfer received for the net recipients is positive and significant (see Columns (2) and (4)
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in Tables 5). For females (see Table 6) the situation is qualitatively similar, although the
relationship between wages and the in-transfer both at the extensive and intensive margins is
a only significant at 10% level.
An interesting feature is that some of the variables have similar effects on both net recipient
and net giver status, thus affecting the probability of engagement in any exchange. Wealthier
males are more likely to be involved in exchange, as are those with greater number of parents,
especially in case they have parents who are single. The latter applies to females as well.
Table 7 summarizes the elasticities from the four-part model at the extensive and intensive











∗ E(y|x, y > 0) + P (y > 0|x)∂E(y|x,y>0)
∂xj
(5)
In terms of the wage elasticities, the lower part in Table 7 shows the estimates of the
wage elasticity at the extensive and intensive margin as well as those for net givers and net
recipients. The overall elasticity of net monetary transfers with respect to wages is given by
the following formula:









where NegExt and PosExt refer to the elasticity for negative transfers and positive trans-
fers respectively at the extensive margin.
Table 7 shows the decomposition of the marginal effects and elasticities for a 1% increase in
wages at both extensive and intensive margins. Estimates in this table imply that the overall
wage effect is to a great extent coming from the changes in the transfer status: higher wages
11Derivation of the marginal effect and the elasticity for the net monetary transfers is given in Appendix B.
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induce more individuals to quit the net recipient status and convert to the net givers status by
either increasing their own monetary transfer to parents or receiving less money from parents.
At the same time, there is no effect on the intensive margin of net givers status, while the
effect on the intensive margin of net recipents is positive, which goes in line with the exchange
motive discussed earlier.As the upper panel in Table 7 shows, the overall wage elasticity of
net transfers calculated using results from the four-part model is smaller in magnitude than
the one calculated from the OLS results.
5 Implications for Further Theoretical Development
As the above empirical analysis suggests, explaining net monetary transfers in a theoretical
model is not a trivial exercise. This section will consider the theory used to model time
and monetary transfers between adult children and their elderly parents. Then a sketch of a
theoretical model based on the results from the previous section will be offered.
Discussion of the existing model
Three of the five studies reviewed earlier build their analysis on a theoretical model of in-
formal care and monetary transfers from adult children to elderly parents (Nizalova, 2012;
Zissimopoulos, 2001; Sloan et al., 200212) with slight modifications.
It is a simple model that involves a giver and a recipient, with an adult child assumed to
be a giver and an elderly parent a recipient. The giver obtains utility from own consumption,
leisure, and utility of the recipient. The giver’s time endowment is allocated between care,
work, and leisure; and his/her labor and non-labor income is spent on consumption goods and
monetary transfers to the recipient. Monetary transfers can be positive as well as negative.
Utility of the recipient, in turn, depends on own consumption and care, which is produced
12Sloan, Zhang, and Wang (2002) assume non-negative transfer from children to their parents in the theoretical
model.
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with only the input of time of other people (market-purchased time or time provided by the
giver), and is subject to the budget constraint.
In this model a non-negativity constraint is not placed on the amount of monetary transfers.
So, monetary transfer can be thought of as an auxiliary mechanism equalizing the marginal
utility of consumption of the giver to that of the recipient after all other decisions have been
made. The likelihood of observing positive net transfer from an adult child to his/her elderly
parent is greatest when the time in caregiving is zero. This happens when the wage rate is
higher than the price of formal care adjusted for the differences in productivity of hired help
compared to that of an informal care giver. As the wage rate decreases, the model predicts
more time devoted to care giving, and thus a smaller monetary transfer from the giver to the
recipient to adjust for the differences in marginal utilities of consumption. As the wage rate
decreases further, the time in caregiving increases and net monetary transfer decreases. This
potentially leads to a reversal of the net monetary flow, i.e. to the negative net monetary
transfer. Some individuals would essentially be paid for their caregiving services to parents
when their wages are too low and/or their productivity in caregiving is too high compared to
the price of formal care.
The decision to participate in intergenerational exchange as well as the amount of transfers
received is solely governed by the comparison of the productivity adjusted wages with the
price of formal care faced by an individual. No utility is derived directly from time or money
transfers given or received. For instance, parents’ preferences for caregiving may be biased
towards the provision of informal care (e.g., when the parents place additional value on the
time spent with their own children rather than with a stranger). This may actually make
parents give more money to their children to induce caregiving as the children’s cost of time
increases.
Although this approach presents a simple way of modeling net transfers and allows for the
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existence of negative net monetary transfers, it has some important limitations. First of all,
the major criticism is that there is no mechanism in place for the parent to be willing to make
a transfer. As the child makes all the decisions, he/she cannot force the parent to provide the
money no matter how negative the desired monetary transfer may be. Another limitation is
that it does not explain the existing pattern of transfers, in particular, the mass at zero in
the distribution of net transfers is not explained by the model. Finally, it treats net transfer
as being a single choice while it is actually a variable that describes an outcome of the two
processes originating from two parties. Hence, it is not capable of explaining the heterogeneous
effect of wages on transfers in the subpopulations of net givers and net recipients.
The simplest way to incorporate the high concentration of probability mass on zero into
a theoretical model is to allow for fixed costs of monetary transactions and/or of providing
informal care. Low liquidity of assets may explain the low probability of observing close to zero
transfers in theory. However, this will not ensure either the mechanism for the parent to be
willing to make a transfer or the differences in the wage effects for net givers and net recipients.
Another possibility would be to use a bargaining model. Failure to reach a mutually beneficial
agreement on the amount of time and monetary transfers would explain in this case the high
probability of observing zeros in the empirical data (e.g. divorce threat or separate spheres
type bargaining model), and at the same time may allow for the heterogeneous wage effects.
Sketching a new theoretical model
Although the development of a theoretical model is not the focus of the current paper, a
sketch of a model that potentially describes the existence of the documented transfer pattern
and the relationships between wages and net transfers estimated is presented here. The model
suggested is an extension of a bargaining model to a two-stage decision-making process. At
first it is decided which roles with respect to monetary transfer the parties will assume. The
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outcome of this stage would be to assign the status of either a giver, or a recipient13, or
neither. The choice of a transfer status defines “separate spheres” (Lundberg and Pollak,
1993): only the giver is unilaterally deciding on the amount of monetary transfer. Separate
spheres bargaining seems a more natural way to model an adult child-parent relationship
since the “divorce” option does not seem credible between the two. In this type of bargaining
models a solution to the noncooperative game is used as a threat point in the cooperative
game.
The preferences of an adult child are represented by a utility function UC(XC , lC , U
P ),
where XC is the child’s consumption, lC = leisure, and U
P = utility of the parent. The
preferences of the parent are to some extent symmetric with the only difference being that
the recipient requires care produced with the help of other people: UP (XP , ZP , U
C), where
XP is consumption, and ZP is care. The following equations represent the time and budget
constraints as well as the production function for care:
XC = IC + wtw − (DC −DP ), (7)
XP + pttm = IP +DC −DP , (8)
tg + tw + lC = T (9)
ZP = γtm + Z
P (tg), (10)
where tw is working time, tg = time provided by the child to the parent, w = the child’s
hourly wage rate, pt = price of market-purchased time tm; IC , IP = the child’s and parent’s
non-labor income respectively. Note that the net transfer is modeled as an outcome of the
two processes here to allow for the differences in the determinants of positive versus negative
13Remember that the transfer pattern suggests that the net and gross monetary transfer are only different in mag-
nitude for less than 1% of the population, i.e. for the most part a giver is the same as a net giver, and a recipient is
not different from a net recipient.
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transfers: DC = transfer from the adult child to the elderly parent, and DP = transfer from
the elderly parent to the adult child.
If the child has the status of a giver (which means that there is no monetary transfer from
the parent), in a noncooperative game he/she is deciding unilaterally on the amount of money
transfered to parents and the amount of time provided, taking into account the amount of
help purchased by the parent in the market. In this case the parent is assigned the status of a
recipient and decides unilaterally on the amount of formal care purchased from the market. If
instead the child is assigned the status of a recipient and the parent that of a giver, then the
child is deciding unilaterally only on the amount of time transfer, and the parent is deciding
unilaterally on the amount of money transfer and the amount of market-purchased help taking
as given the child’s informal care provision. If they are deciding not to participate in any kind
of monetary exchange, then the child is only deciding on the amount of informal care provided,
and the parent is deciding on the amount of formal care purchased. In either case, Cournot
equilibrium will produce the indirect utility functions TG and TR that are then considered as
threat points in the cooperative Nash bargaining framework:
max(UG − TG)(UR − TR) (11)
To connect this theoretical model with an empirical four-part model described earlier,








ij ) is a Nash social welfare function evaluated at the
optimal allocation for the adult child - elderly parent pair i under the j’s assignment of transfer
status. j can take values of different transfer status as described in Section 4. The model is
solved backwards. First, the parties calculate the product of their utility surpluses over the
separate spheres outcomes for different assignments of monetary transfer status. After that
they compare the corresponding values of the Nash social welfare function and choose the
assignment of transfer status that produces the maximum welfare.
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As could be seen, the model allows for a separate decision rule at the extensive versus
intensive margin by modeling the choice of transfer status explicitly. After the decision on the
transfer status is made, the amount of the transfer is chosen by the giver accounting for both
the giver’s and the recipient’s characteristics. This allows for a possibility of heterogeneous
effects for negative and positive parts of the net transfer distribution.
Conclusions
This paper has undertaken a systematic evaluation of the choice of the net versus gross measure
of monetary transfers in intergenerational exchange. The main finding is that the results of
the empirical analysis are very sensitive to the choice of the transfer measure and thus this
matter calls for special attention in the analysis design. It is shown that the wage effect
is much larger in magnitude when estimated using the gross measure of transfers compared
to the net measure of transfers. This happens mostly because net recipients are treated as
non-participants in exchange, and the wage effect is different for that part of the population.
To relax the restrictions placed on the analysis by the OLS specification, an alternative four-
part empirical model is proposed to analyze the effect of wages on net monetary transfers.
This model allows for a separate treatment of the transfers at the extensive and intensive
margins as well as for the differences in the process of giving compared to that of receiving.
It consists of two Gragg’s double-hurdle models. The estimates of the wage effects at the
intensive margin show that conditional on net giving status wages do not affect the amount
of money transferred to their parents. At the same time, conditional on net receiving status,
high wage individuals tend to receive more money from their parents.
Combining the estimates of the wage effects from all the parts of the model allows for a
comparison with the OLS estimates using net monetary transfers. It appears that the OLS
in general overestimates the marginal effect of wages on net monetary transfers. Most of the
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effect stems from the extensive margin: as their wages go up individuals are more likely to stop
getting money from their parents and more likely to start giving money to their parents. There
is also a significant positive effect of wages on transfers received from to parents among the
net recipients with that being small in magnitude and statistically insignificant among the net
givers. In addition to providing more consistent estimates of the wage effects, the estimation
of the four-part model uncovers other important features of the underlying processes: some
of the characteristics have similar effects on both probability of being a net recipient and
probability of being a net giver, which can be interpreted as a probability of participation in
intergenerational exchange. Among these are wealth (wealthier male children are both more
likely to get transfers and more likely to give transfers), the number of parents (more parents
living - more chances to either giver or receive), and an indicator for having a single parent.
Overall, empirical findings suggest that the theoretical models used to explain transfers in the
literature on the wage effects on intergenerational exchange do not fully describe the reality.
Therefore, this paper concludes with an outline of a new theoretical model that is potentially
capable of explaining the documented patterns and relationships. The model suggested in
the paper is a two-stage game-theoretic model based on the Lundberg and Pollak’s (1993)
separate spheres bargaining framework.
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Figure 1: Monetary Transfers by Hourly Wage Rate
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Table 1: Examples of Monetary Transfer Measures Used in Empirical Research
Unit of analysis - adult child:
1. Gross Transfer received y>0 Actual amount of transfer
received for those who received
any money from parents
y=0 Zero transfer for those who:
– neither gave nor received any money
– gave money to parents,
but did not receive any money
2. Gross Transfer given y>0 Actual amount of transfer
given for those who gave
any money to parents
y=0 Zero transfer for those who:
– neither gave nor received any money
– received money from parents,
but did not give any money
3. Positive Net Transfer received y>0 Transfers received minus
transfers given, for those who
received more than gave
y=0 Zero transfer for those who:
– neither gave nor received any money
– those who gave more money to parents
than received from parents
4. Net Transfer received y>0 Transfers received minus
transfers given, for those who
received more than gave
y=0 Zero transfer for those who:
– neither gave nor received any money
– gave exactly the same amount of money
to parents as was received
from parents
y<0 Transfers given minus
transfers received, for those who
gave more than received
5. Net Transfer given Is the opposite of net transfer received
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Table 2: Summary of the Studies of Wage Effect on Monetary Transfers
Wage Effect Wage Elasticity Uncensored
Couch et al. (1999), 1988 PSID, Children HHs, gross
Linear-log simultaneous Tobit Married Single Married Single Married Single
couples couples couples
male 1994** 1075+ 1.17** 0.40+
4.57%
3.72%
female 722+ 1309** 0.42+ 2.44** 3.69%
Zissimopoulos (2001), 1994 HRS, Parents’ HHs, gross
Log-log separate Tobit Has No Has No
sibling sibling sibling sibling
from any child 0.28* 0.04* 15.00%
from male child 0.33 0.56 0.05 0.09 16.00%
from female child 0.15 0.12 0.02 0.02 15.00%
Sloan et al. (2002), 1992 HRS, Children, gross
Cragg’s two-part Probit OLS Extensive Intensive
from any child 0.27** 0.27** 2.60 0.27 11.00%
Ioannides and Kann (1999), 1988 PSID, Children HHs, gross
Separate Tobit
Given:
Husband wage 49* 0.33*
4.10%
Wife wage 63* 0.17*
Received:
Husband wage -21 -0.11 22.41%
Wife wage -10 -0.02









Table 3: Sample Description, HRS, 1992-2008
Males Females
Variable Mean SD Median Mean SD Median
Number of cases 11,387 13,275
Transfers:
Recipients 6.09% 6.53%
Net recipients 5.95% 6.29%
Givers 15.35% 15.15%
Net givers 15.18% 15.00%
Net Transfer -66.89 (3775.74) -56.28 (3734.28)
Gross unconditional received -359.86 (3496.74) -343.10 (3414.16)
Gross conditional received -5782.68 (12820.33) -2094.36 -5121.39 (12183.12) -1579.78
Gross unconditional given 292.97 (1504.97) 286.82 (1499.19)
Gross conditional given 1865.53 (3379.12) 871.66 1858.53 (3397.27) 871.66
Net unconditional received -349.85 (3448.94) -333.77 (3399.72)
Net conditional received -5856.39 (12891.73) -2145.06 -5282.76 (12475.28) -1778.65
Net unconditional given 282.96 (1470.71) 277.49 (1483.76)
Net conditional given 1863.53 (3352.18) 871.66 1857.54 (3420.17) 871.66
Income:
Non-labor income ($1K) 10.95 (39.86) 14.48 (45.92)
HH wealth ($100K) 3.35 (6.13) 3.56 (7.60)
Hourly wage rate 24.25 (14.80) 17.98 (10.90)
Other characteristics:
Age 57.12 (4.99) 54.48 (5.51)
Education 13.04 (3.16) 13.19 (2.60)
If non-white 14.43% 17.66%
If hispanic 10.06% 8.05%
If married 91.90% 79.22%
If poor health 13.28% 11.53%
Number of children (0-5) 0.05 (0.27) 0.05 (0.27)
Number of children (6-18) 0.30 (0.69) 0.26 (0.64)
Number of own sisters 1.49 (1.49) 1.56 (1.57)
Number of own borthers 1.45 (1.47) 1.49 (1.44)
Number of spouse’s sisters 1.43 (1.56) 1.15 (1.45)
Number of spouse’s brothers 1.39 (1.44) 1.11 (1.41)
Parents’ characteristics:
Number of living parents 1.66 (0.80) 1.59 (0.76)
Maximum age 81.81 (6.63) 81.88 (6.50)
Percent of mothers 73.49% 74.11%
Parents’ education 11.95 (3.40) 11.93 (3.23)
If at least one parent
- single 77.77% 76.94%
- needs care 28.26% 27.01%
- cannot be left alone 18.63% 17.41%
- homeowner 74.97% 73.65%
- poorer 44.13% 41.37%
- richer 41.08% 41.76%
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Table 4: Results from OLS Estimation
Males Females
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS-NGive OLS-GGive OLS-GRec OLS-NGive OLS-GGive OLS-GRec
Log wage 0.2754** 0.1301* -0.1309** 0.3629** 0.2700** -0.0815+
(0.0814) (0.0613) (0.0494) (0.0803) (0.0625) (0.0473)
Age 0.0128 0.0589 0.0432 0.0879 0.0226 -0.0691
(0.0880) (0.0740) (0.0473) (0.0812) (0.0600) (0.0520)
Age sq 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0002 0.0005
(0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Educ 0.0174 -0.0721 -0.1064** -0.1381 -0.2056* -0.0770**
(0.0609) (0.0543) (0.0245) (0.0902) (0.0848) (0.0258)
Educ sq 0.0003 0.0051* 0.0055** 0.0051 0.0095** 0.0047**
(0.0026) (0.0022) (0.0013) (0.0036) (0.0032) (0.0013)
Non-labor inc 0.0027* 0.0024* -0.0003 0.0010 0.0013+ 0.0002
(0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0004)
HH wealth 0.0079 0.0160* 0.0077 0.0022 0.0004 -0.0012
(0.0093) (0.0068) (0.0050) (0.0043) (0.0038) (0.0019)
Nwhite 0.9998** 0.7522** -0.2394** 0.6197** 0.4897** -0.1332*
(0.1271) (0.1149) (0.0470) (0.1142) (0.0968) (0.0572)
Hisp 0.6440** 0.4753** -0.1572** 0.6450** 0.6302** -0.0371
(0.1728) (0.1607) (0.0559) (0.1904) (0.1719) (0.0701)
Married -0.3104* -0.3796** -0.0801 0.2232* -0.0784 -0.3247**
(0.1472) (0.1296) (0.0853) (0.1107) (0.0858) (0.0662)
Poor health -0.0069 0.0406 0.0520 -0.0710 0.0845 0.1645**
(0.1004) (0.0801) (0.0576) (0.1052) (0.0844) (0.0590)
Children (0–5) -0.1143 -0.0376 0.0835 0.0154 -0.0310 -0.0397
(0.1293) (0.0927) (0.0825) (0.1083) (0.0919) (0.0561)
Children (6–18) -0.1533* -0.0320 0.1166** -0.1228+ -0.0113 0.1015*
(0.0675) (0.0513) (0.0400) (0.0652) (0.0487) (0.0407)
N of own sis -0.0388 -0.0311 0.0098 0.0632* -0.0008 -0.0510**
(0.0281) (0.0221) (0.0152) (0.0250) (0.0208) (0.0121)
N of own bro 0.0514+ 0.0228 -0.0270+ 0.0099 -0.0128 -0.0206
(0.0268) (0.0223) (0.0138) (0.0271) (0.0224) (0.0138)
N of spouse sis 0.0115 -0.0176 -0.0275* -0.0105 0.0042 0.0197
(0.0270) (0.0221) (0.0136) (0.0277) (0.0226) (0.0146)
N of spouse bro 0.0052 0.0026 0.0002 0.0247 0.0168 -0.0091
(0.0311) (0.0252) (0.0159) (0.0292) (0.0246) (0.0141)
N of parents 0.2854** 0.3605** 0.0725* 0.2085** 0.2918** 0.0849*
(0.0621) (0.0469) (0.0367) (0.0625) (0.0466) (0.0367)
Mothers/parents 0.2108+ 0.2918** 0.0499 0.2833* 0.3428** 0.0369
(0.1190) (0.0862) (0.0772) (0.1119) (0.0799) (0.0753)
Parents’ age -0.0137* -0.0052 0.0076* -0.0088 0.0022 0.0096*
(0.0067) (0.0056) (0.0036) (0.0068) (0.0055) (0.0038)
Parents’ educ -0.0619** -0.0140 0.0437** -0.0506** -0.0064 0.0444**
(0.0168) (0.0139) (0.0080) (0.0158) (0.0128) (0.0083)
Continued on next page
31
Table 4 – Continued
Males Females
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS-NGive OLS-GGive OLS-GRec OLS-NGive OLS-GGive OLS-GRec
At least one parent
- single 0.2178* 0.3229** 0.1104+ 0.1486+ 0.2837** 0.1480**
(0.0945) (0.0706) (0.0575) (0.0873) (0.0668) (0.0524)
- needs care 0.0447 -0.0174 -0.0586 0.0251 0.0068 -0.0297
(0.0892) (0.0735) (0.0459) (0.0857) (0.0694) (0.0466)
- cannot be 0.0740 0.1054 0.0193 -0.0068 -0.0029 0.0188
left alone (0.0981) (0.0797) (0.0511) (0.0913) (0.0733) (0.0499)
- homeowner -0.0436 0.0117 0.0492 0.0185 0.0415 0.0276
(0.0957) (0.0814) (0.0448) (0.0897) (0.0745) (0.0461)
- poorer 0.8224** 0.7197** -0.1096* 0.8435** 0.6969** -0.1552**
(0.0828) (0.0671) (0.0434) (0.0798) (0.0668) (0.0397)
- richer -0.9860** -0.4509** 0.5021** -1.0081** -0.4896** 0.4862**
(0.0851) (0.0636) (0.0525) (0.0805) (0.0590) (0.0495)
Observations 11,387 11,387 11,387 13,275 13,275 13,275
R-squared 0.0956 0.0875 0.0570 0.0929 0.0819 0.0555
Notes: 1.Sample includes working, non-self-employed individuals who have at least one parent (or parent-in-law for
married individuals) alive. For the details on the construction of the sample see Nizalova (2012). Additional covariates
include year dummies. Standard errors are cluster robust. 2. OLS-GGiv refers to gross out-transfers and OLS-GRec –
to gross in-transfers the HRS respondents give to or receive from their elderly parents respectively. 3. Standard errors
in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
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Table 5: Double Craggs Model Estimates, Males 1992-2008
Craggit-Out Transfer Craggit-In Transfer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
P(Give) Amount P(Receive) Amount
Predicted P(outcome) 0.1290 0.0395
Log wage 0.0842* 0.0677 -0.1615** 0.2624**
(0.0400) (0.0498) (0.0485) (0.0935)
Age 0.0598 -0.0709 0.0740 0.1671
(0.0534) (0.1008) (0.0632) (0.1707)
Age squared -0.0005 0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0013
(0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0015)
Education -0.0369 -0.0811* -0.0367 0.0855
(0.0305) (0.0340) (0.0484) (0.1388)
Education squared 0.0028* 0.0044** 0.0029 -0.0013
(0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0054)
Non-labor income 0.0010* 0.0011* -0.0004 0.0007
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0023)
Total hh wealth 0.0061* 0.0087* 0.0051+ 0.0255**
(0.0027) (0.0036) (0.0031) (0.0081)
If non-white 0.4255** 0.1396* -0.3749** -0.5884*
(0.0578) (0.0678) (0.0908) (0.2720)
If hispanic 0.2891** 0.0323 -0.3687** -0.6149*
(0.0853) (0.0922) (0.1282) (0.2437)
If married -0.2455** -0.1861+ -0.0994 0.1020
(0.0816) (0.0951) (0.0967) (0.1833)
If poor health 0.0200 0.0774 0.0792 -0.0903
(0.0542) (0.0671) (0.0768) (0.1760)
Children (0-5) 0.0118 -0.2390** 0.0931 0.0896
(0.0614) (0.0601) (0.0843) (0.1876)
Children (6-18) -0.0207 0.0014 0.1094** 0.0978
(0.0319) (0.0323) (0.0325) (0.0680)
N of own sis -0.0107 -0.0558** 0.0018 0.0111
(0.0140) (0.0170) (0.0205) (0.0403)
N of own bro 0.0173 -0.0284 -0.0296 -0.0615
(0.0141) (0.0193) (0.0200) (0.0396)
N of spouse sis -0.0073 -0.0200 -0.0414* -0.0316
(0.0141) (0.0184) (0.0209) (0.0384)
N of spouse bro 0.0053 -0.0147 -0.0023 0.0222
(0.0157) (0.0210) (0.0199) (0.0441)
Continued on next page
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Table 5: Double Craggs Model Estimates, Males 1992-2008
Craggit-Out Transfer Craggit-In Transfer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
P(Give) Amount P(Receive) Amount
Number of parents 0.2366** 0.1242** 0.0704* 0.0283
(0.0289) (0.0406) (0.0348) (0.0739)
Mothers/parents 0.2270** 0.2183* 0.0359 0.1901
(0.0704) (0.0939) (0.0874) (0.1681)
Parents’ age -0.0037 0.0000 0.0100* 0.0159
(0.0036) (0.0045) (0.0044) (0.0104)
Parents’ education -0.0073 0.0056 0.0547** -0.0011
(0.0083) (0.0105) (0.0107) (0.0214)
If at least one parent
single 0.2295** 0.0040 0.1247* -0.0462
(0.0536) (0.0722) (0.0617) (0.1466)
needs care 0.0075 -0.0024 -0.0782 -0.0316
(0.0449) (0.0564) (0.0576) (0.1262)
cannot be left alone 0.0541 0.1644* -0.0310 0.2823+
(0.0471) (0.0639) (0.0620) (0.1480)
homeowner -0.0089 0.0537 0.0846 0.2688+
(0.0489) (0.0581) (0.0655) (0.1380)
is poorer 0.4616** -0.0240 -0.1097* -0.0473
(0.0406) (0.0566) (0.0541) (0.1322)
is richer -0.3434** -0.0765 0.5345** 0.2652*





Notes: 1. Marginal effects are reported. 2. dy/dx for dummy variable is an effect of discrete change from 0 to 1.
3. See Notes to Table 4.
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Table 6: Double Craggs Model Estimates, Females 1992-2008
Craggit-Out Transfer Craggit-In Transfer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
P(Give) Amount P(Receive) Amount
Craggit-Out Transfer Craggit-In Transfer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
P(Give) Amount P(Receive) Amount
Predicted P(outcome) 0.1287 0.0440
Log wage 0.1670** 0.0669 -0.0822+ 0.1754+
(0.0405) (0.0558) (0.0469) (0.1014)
Age 0.0035 -0.0212 -0.0680 -0.0580
(0.0420) (0.0507) (0.0459) (0.1024)
Age squared -0.0000 0.0002 0.0005 0.0005
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0009)
Education -0.0887* -0.1358** 0.0492 0.1848
(0.0391) (0.0340) (0.0634) (0.2273)
Education squared 0.0043** 0.0064** -0.0001 -0.0057
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0024) (0.0083)
Non-labor income 0.0005 0.0016** 0.0003 0.0012
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0016)
Total hh wealth 0.0002 0.0015 -0.0016 0.0232*
(0.0022) (0.0043) (0.0028) (0.0113)
If non-white 0.3052** 0.0507 -0.1798* -0.2796*
(0.0541) (0.0639) (0.0800) (0.1393)
If hispanic 0.3753** 0.1098 -0.1003 0.2039
(0.0848) (0.0827) (0.1036) (0.2760)
If married -0.0590 -0.0669 -0.3769** 0.1940
(0.0576) (0.0787) (0.0659) (0.1297)
If poor health 0.0491 -0.0194 0.2274** -0.3171**
(0.0527) (0.0632) (0.0638) (0.1198)
Children (0-5) 0.0032 -0.1520** -0.0649 -0.0848
(0.0565) (0.0586) (0.0882) (0.2067)
Children (6-18) -0.0088 0.0012 0.1022** 0.0437
(0.0301) (0.0335) (0.0326) (0.0744)
N of own sis 0.0036 -0.0212 -0.0768** -0.0356
(0.0130) (0.0157) (0.0185) (0.0352)
N of own bro -0.0063 -0.0200 -0.0350* 0.0438
(0.0144) (0.0172) (0.0175) (0.0431)
N of spouse sis 0.0081 -0.0202 0.0205 -0.0233
Continued on next page
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Table 6: Double Craggs Model Estimates, Females 1992-2008
Craggit-Out Transfer Craggit-In Transfer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
P(Give) Amount P(Receive) Amount
(0.0140) (0.0176) (0.0185) (0.0435)
N of spouse bro 0.0100 -0.0294 -0.0095 -0.0491
(0.0155) (0.0199) (0.0190) (0.0445)
Number of parents 0.1974** 0.1552** 0.1062** -0.0405
(0.0290) (0.0396) (0.0349) (0.0737)
Mothers/parents 0.2845** 0.0801 0.0149 0.0755
(0.0659) (0.0914) (0.0854) (0.1384)
Parents’ age 0.0016 -0.0024 0.0104* 0.0086
(0.0035) (0.0045) (0.0043) (0.0095)
Parents’ education -0.0069 0.0226** 0.0520** 0.0212
(0.0079) (0.0087) (0.0098) (0.0189)
If at least one parent
single 0.2030** 0.1946** 0.1778** 0.0935
(0.0513) (0.0662) (0.0557) (0.1148)
cannot be left alone 0.0121 0.0526 -0.0555 0.2936*
(0.0427) (0.0541) (0.0522) (0.1164)
needs care -0.0155 0.1579** -0.0186 0.1947
(0.0450) (0.0602) (0.0563) (0.1333)
homeowner 0.0206 -0.0591 0.0586 0.1521
(0.0458) (0.0567) (0.0608) (0.1166)
is poorer 0.4308** -0.0400 -0.1821** -0.0222
(0.0396) (0.0536) (0.0520) (0.1180)
is richer -0.3838** -0.0649 0.4814** 0.3525**
(0.0428) (0.0582) (0.0506) (0.1107)
Sigma 0.8957** 1.2204**
(0.0176) (0.0248)
Observations 13,275 13,275 13,275 13,275
R-squared/Chi2 675.33 481.03
Notes: 1. Marginal effects are reported. 2. dy/dx for dummy variable is an effect of discrete change from 0 to 1.
3. See Notes to Table 4.
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Table 7: Estimates of the Wage Elasticities
Estimated Males Females
4-part model OLS 4-part model OLS
E 0.2521** 0.2754** 0.3151** 0.3629**





Egiv ext 0.1243* 0.2454**
(0.0418) (0.0444)
Egiv int 0.0104 0.0101
(0.0076) (0.0073)
Erec ext -0.1333** -0.0711*
(0.0353) (0.0315)




Assuming that the net transfers are nothing else but the combination of gross transfers in
different directions and there is zero probability of having one individual to be a giver and
a recipient, the following exercise can be carried out. Suppose the data can be divided into
three subsamples: one for positive values of net transfers, one for zero net transfers, and one






























































Figure 2: Graphical Representation of the Relationship Between βNet and βGross)
Suppose that y− positive represents observations with positive transfers and y− negative
represents observations corresponding to negative transfers, and βNet and βGross are the esti-
mates of the effect of wages on net and gross transfers respectively. ygross represents obser-
vations on the dependent variable with all the negative values replaced by zeros. Then, the







































βNet = βGross +
∑
y−negative (x− x)(y − ygross)∑
(x− x)2
(14)
which means that the coefficient on net transfers differs from the coefficient on gross trans-
fers by the term the sign of which is defined by the coefficient from the model estimated using
only observations with negative dependent variable. Summarizing:
βNet > βGross if βNeg > 0
βNet = βGross if βNeg = 0












































= βPosP (y > 0)
V ar(x|y>0)
V ar(x)






Similar to Cragg (1971) the expected net monetary transfer conditional on explanatory vari-
ables can be formulated as follows:
Given that
E(y|x) = P (y < 0|x) ∗ E(y|x, y < 0) + P (y = 0|x) ∗ 0 + P (y > 0|x) ∗ E(y|x, y > 0) (20)
Differentiating this expression with respect to xj produces the following expression for


















∗ E(y|x, y < 0) + P (y < 0|x) ∗ βNeg+
+∂P (y>0|x)
∂xj
∗ E(y|x, y > 0) + P (y > 0|x) ∗ βPos
(22)
As is evident from the formula, the overall effect of changes in an explanatory variable can
be represented as a summation of the effects on the probability of observing a certain transfer
status as well as changes in the amount of transfers for those who remain in the givers’ or
recipients’ categories.
To derive the formulas for the wage elasticities, it is useful to recall that xj = log(wage)





. So the four wage elasticities that will be useful in calculating
the wage elasticity of net monetary transfers are the following:
ǫNegExt =
∂P (y < 0|x)
∂xj
1
P (y < 0|x)
(23)
ǫPosExt =
∂P (y > 0|x)
∂xj
1









E(y|x, y > 0)
, (26)
where βNeg and βPos represent the coefficients from the estimating the wage effects for the
population of net recipients and net givers respectively.
Combining this elasticities leads to the following expression:




+(ǫPosExt + ǫPos) ∗
P (y>0|x)∗E(y|x,y>0)
E(y|x)
,
(27)
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